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Corporate Culture Choices in Bertrand Competition: Customer Orientation versus Corporate Social Responsibility

ABSTRACT:- This paper examines firms’ endogenous choice between customer orientation (CO) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously and independently selects the optimal level of its corporate culture, specifically regarding CO and CSR; in the second stage, each firm simultaneously and independently sets its price to maximize its objective function. Using subgame-perfect equilibrium, we compare profits under CO, which values the surplus of a firm’s own customers, and CSR, which values aggregate consumer surplus. We show that firms earn the same equilibrium profits for all feasible corporate culture levels. This result differs sharply from the corresponding Cournot result, in which firms prefer CO, and highlights how the mode of competition shapes corporate culture choices.

Keywords: Bertrand model; Customer orientation; Corporate social responsibility; Differentiated products; Subgame perfection

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