ABSTRACT: This study examines whether transfer pricing and tax aggressiveness create or destroy firm value through the agency-conflict channel. A balanced panel of 205 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2019-2024 produced 1,230 firm-year observations. Transfer pricing is proxied by related-party receivables relative to total receivables, tax aggressiveness by effective tax rates, agency conflict by free cash flow scaled by total assets, and firm value by Tobin’s Q. Common-effect and random-effect estimators were selected through Chow, Hausman, and Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests. Robust standard errors and Sobel tests were used for inference and mediation. Transfer pricing is negatively related to agency conflict at the 10% level and negatively related to firm value at the 1% level. Tax aggressiveness increases agency conflict but has a positive direct association with firm value. Agency conflict reduces firm value. The indirect transfer-pricing effect is small and positive, whereas the indirect tax-aggressiveness effect is small and negative; both constitute partial competitive mediation. Leverage is positively associated with firm value, while firm age and profitability are not statistically significant. The findings separate the tax-saving channel from the agency-cost channel and show that different tax strategies can generate opposing direct and indirect valuation effects in an emerging market with concentrated ownership

 KEYWORDS– transfer pricing; tax aggressiveness; agency conflict; firm value; corporate tax strategy